Learning in games using the imprecise Dirichlet model  by Quaeghebeur, Erik & de Cooman, Gert
Learning in games using the imprecise Dirichlet model
Erik Quaeghebeur *,1, Gert de Cooman
SYSTeMS Research Group, EESA Department, Ghent University, Technologiepark-Zwijnaarde 914, 9052 Zwijnaarde, Belgium
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:












a b s t r a c t
We propose a new learning model for ﬁnite strategic-form two-player games based on ﬁc-
titious play and Walley’s imprecise Dirichlet model [P. Walley, Inferences from multino-
mial data: learning about a bag of marbles, J. Roy. Statist. Soc. B 58 (1996) 3–57]. This
model allows the initial beliefs of the players about their opponent’s strategy choice to
be near-vacuous or imprecise instead of being precisely deﬁned. A similar generalization
can be made as the one proposed by Fudenberg and Kreps [D. Fudenberg, D.M. Kreps,
Learning mixed equilibria, Games Econ. Behav. 5 (1993) 320–367] for ﬁctitious play, where
assumptions about immediate behavior are replaced with assumptions about asymptotic
behavior. We also obtain similar convergence results for this generalization: if there is con-
vergence, it will be to an equilibrium.
 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
This paper describes a new approach to learning for ﬁnite strategic-form two-player games in the setting of ﬁctitious play.
So, consider successive rounds of a game. Suppose we are in the tth round, and that at this point, each player has certain
beliefs about which strategy his opponent will play in the next, (t þ 1)th, round.
After each round of the game the players change their beliefs. Indeed, we assume that each player can observe the strat-
egy his opponent plays, which naturally leads to the setting of so-called ﬁctitious play [2,11]. After each round, this new
information affects the player’s beliefs about the strategy his opponent will play next. This updating of beliefs is what we
call learning about the opponent’s strategy choice.
In a Bayesian context, such beliefs are represented by a probability distribution on the opponent’s strategies (a precise
Dirichlet model or PDM), and learning is implemented by updating with Bayes’s rule using a likelihood function relating
observations to future strategies. The model we propose for representing and updating these beliefs generalizes this Bayes-
ian approach. It is based on Walley’s imprecise Dirichlet model or IDM [13]. Using this generalization is justiﬁed by the fact
that sometimes the assumptions underlying the Bayesian approach are too strong. The most visible difference is that the
beliefs are summarized by a convex set of expected mixed strategies, instead of only one.
Now, given such beliefs about his opponent’s next strategy choice, and the game’s payoff function, which strategy should
a player use in the next round to satisfy some optimality criterion? In a Bayesian context, optimal strategies maximize a
player’s expected payoff. As optimality criteria, we propose two generalizations of the concept of expectation maximiza-
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tion. The main consequence is that – in contrast to the Bayesian context – two different optimal strategies may be
incomparable.
If both players use a method of learning and of choosing optimal strategies during the successive rounds of a game, will
their behavior converge: Will the optimal strategies they select converge to an equilibrium of the game?2 Or, when conver-
gence occurs, will it be to an equilibrium? We investigate whether some interesting, existing results [5] for players using a PDM-
based learning model can be generalized to the case where the players use our IDM-based learning model.
How is this paper organized? In Section 2 we describe its game-theoretic setting and introduce basic game-theoretic con-
cepts and notation. In Section 3, we look at how a player can represent and update his beliefs about his opponent’s strategy.
Both the PDM-based Bayesian model and our IDM-based generalization are improvements of the classical model of ﬁctitious
play [2,11]. In Section 4 we discuss the player’s options for deciding on an optimal strategy. Most importantly, we investigate
options that can be used in conjunction with the PDM-based and IDM-based models. Our contribution up until this point is
mainly to show how well imprecise probability theory can be allied with game theory. Then, in Section 5, before concluding,
this alliance is used to generalize results by Fudenberg and Kreps [5] about the convergence of play to equilibria. All proofs
are collected in Appendix A at the end.
2. Basic concepts and notation
We consider two-player games and use i as an index for a player and i as an index for his opponent. This allows for
player-neutral notation and formulas.
Both players have a ﬁnite set Si ¼ f1; . . . ;Nig of Ni pure strategies si, each of which labels a possibly complex description.
When the choice of pure strategy is determined through some form of randomization, the player uses a mixed strategy
ri : Si ! ½0;1. We use riðsiÞ to denote the chance that si is played when ri is used. (We use the word chance when talking
about uncertainty due to randomization. When discussing the uncertainty of a player, we use the word probability.) The
set of all mixed strategies Ri forms a unit simplex in RN
i
, where the vertices correspond to the pure strategies and mixed
strategies to the convex combinations with weights riðsiÞ, i.e., PlriðlÞ ¼ 1. All quantities that can be interpreted as a mixed
strategy are denoted with a lower case Greek letter. From now on, ‘strategy’ implicitly means ‘mixed strategy’, unless explic-
itly stated otherwise.
A strategy proﬁle is a couple of two strategies, one for each player. The notation for pure and mixed strategy proﬁles is
deﬁned and illustrated in Fig. 1.
Since we assume that the randomization mechanisms both players use are independent, the chance that s is played
when r is used, is given by rðsÞ :¼ riðsiÞriðsiÞ.
Each round of a game consists of a pure strategy being selected by the players. After every round, each player receives a
bounded payoff uiðsÞ expressed in some linear utility [12]. When the players use mixed strategies, the expected payoff
becomes







During each round, the player chooses a strategy based on assumptions about his expected payoff. With each of his own
strategies ri there corresponds an unknown payoff uri which is a function relating his opponent’s (still unknown) strategy
choice ri to the corresponding (expected) payoff:
uri : R
i ! R : ri 7! uri ðriÞ ¼ uiðri; riÞ: ð2Þ
Such an unknown payoff is a real random variable on Ri which we call a gamble [12]: choosing a strategy is like participating
in a lottery. When choosing his strategy, the player is unsure about the amount of utility he is going to win (or lose).
The game is played repeatedly, and during each round t the players observe the pure strategy proﬁle st :¼ ðsit ; sit Þ that is
actually played in that round. The mixed strategy proﬁle that is played cannot be observed, i.e., the opponent’s mixed strat-
egy choice remains hidden. All the pure strategy proﬁles that were played up to and during round t form the history- after t
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Fig. 1. The set R of strategy proﬁles for players with two pure strategies each and two of its elements: one mixed, r, and one pure, s.
244 E. Quaeghebeur, G. de Cooman / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 243–256
rounds ht ¼ ðs1; . . . ; sk; . . . ; stÞ. Given a history ht , the pure strategy proﬁle played during round t0 6 t is htðt0Þ. All the possible
histories after t rounds form the Cartesian product setHt :¼ St . When considering an unending number of rounds, we talk
about an inﬁnite history h1 ¼ ðs1; s2; . . .Þ, which is an element ofH1. The set of all possible histories isH :¼
S
tHt .
Single player histories are also used. These are written down using superscripts as hit , or h
i
t for the opponent. This is done
similarly for the other history concepts.
The opponent’s history hit can be summarized by how many times the opponent has played each of his pure strategies.
This observed strategy count is formalized with the function ni :Hi  Si ! N : ðhit ; siÞ 7! niðhit ; siÞ, where niðhit ; siÞ is
the total number of rounds the opponent has played si in the history hit . It immediately follows that
P
si2Si n
iðhit ; siÞ ¼ t.
When the history hit under consideration is implicit, we use the notation n
i
t for n
iðhit ; Þ. Similarly, we can also consider mi,
the (relative) frequency of observed strategies, where miðhit ; siÞ ¼ niðhit ; siÞ=t is the total fraction of the rounds the oppo-




t =t. We also
use count and frequency proﬁles n :¼ ðni;niÞ and m :¼ ðmi; miÞ.
3. Assessing the opponent’s strategy
In this section,we look atwhat a player (thinkshe) knows about his opponent’s strategy choice andhow tomodel this belief.
We start out in Section 3.1with the basic assumptionsmade by the player. Then,we consider possible beliefmodels andhow to
update them using observations of the pure strategies played during previous rounds in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, where we intro-
duce the imprecise Dirichlet model. Finally, in Section 3.4, we link so-called assessment rules to these belief models.
3.1. Modelling the opponent
In the classical model of ﬁctitious play [2,11], the players base their strategy choice on their opponent’s so-called accumu-
lated mixed strategy. This corresponds to using mit , the frequency of observed pure strategies played by the opponent in the
ﬁrst t rounds. (Note that this can be interpreted as a strategy of the opponent.)
To make the basic assumption of this model explicit [7, Chapter 2], we can say that each player is convinced that his oppo-
nent is playing a ﬁxed mixed strategy that is (initially completely) unknown to him. This implies that the players do not try to
inﬂuence their opponent’s strategy choices. They do try to learn as much as they can about this unknown strategy from the
observation of their opponent’s play. Because of this assumption, the order of the strategies played by the opponent is irrel-
evant, and the only observational data a player uses is the sufﬁcient statistic ni or, equivalently, t and mi.
So, under the assumptions of ﬁctitious play, the opponent is modelled as an unknown iid-process (identical independent
draws). A player could imagine his opponent drawing marbles from a bag (sampling with replacement from a ﬁnite set).
Marble types then correspond to pure strategies of the opponent and the relative frequency of each type to the unknown
mixed strategy played by the opponent.
Considering the model given for the opponent, just using the frequency of observed strategies mi as the assessment for his
strategy seems natural, but is nevertheless problematic:What is the rationale behind this choice of an assessment, andwhat is
the justiﬁcation for modifying it once a new round has been played? Classically, an interpretation is given by assuming that
the players use a form of Bayesian inference [7, Chapter 2]. This will be described and investigated in the following subsection.
3.2. The precise Dirichlet model
The assessments made in the model of ﬁctitious play are formulated in the framework of Bayesian inference as follows.
The player considers all of his opponent’s mixed strategies to be possible a priori. So he uses a prior probability density func-
tion over his opponent’s simplex to model his uncertainty about his opponent’s mixed strategy choice – assumed to be ﬁxed
in time. After observing the pure strategy played by his opponent in that round, he can construct a likelihood function. Using
Bayes’s rule, the prior and the likelihood function are combined to form a posterior probability density function over his
opponent’s simplex. This posterior then models his uncertainty about the opponent’s strategy choice, after having observed
the pure strategy played by the opponent.
Because the opponent is modelled as an iid-process and has a ﬁnite number of pure strategies, the likelihood function,
deﬁned on Ri, takes the form of a multinomial probability mass function Lðri j nit Þ /
Q
si2Sir
iðsiÞnit ðsiÞ. For any
history hit , it gives the chance that n
i
t was produced by an opponent using a mixed strategy r
i.
The basis for our models is the Dirichlet density Dð j r; qiÞ. It is deﬁned on the interior intðRiÞ of the unit simplex Ri by
Dðri j r; qiÞ /Qsi2SiriðsiÞrqiðsiÞ1, where r 2 Rþ and qi 2 intðRiÞ. The family of Dirichlet densities can take on a variety
of shapes, depending on the choice of parameters and thus represent a variety of (prior) beliefs. This is the reason for using
this family, together with them being conjugate for multinomial sampling, resulting in posteriors from the same family that
are easily obtained. The linear prevision (expectation functional) Pð j r; qiÞ associated with a Dirichlet density Dð j r; qiÞ is
called a precise Dirichlet model or PDM. It is deﬁned on measurable gambles (real valued random variables on Ri). The pre-
vision of riðsiÞ, i.e., the prevision of the chance that the opponent plays si,
PðriðsiÞ j r; qiÞ ¼
Z
intðRiÞ
riðsiÞDðri j r; qiÞdri; ð3Þ
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turns out to be equal to the parameter qiðsiÞ. This implies that Pðri j r; qiÞ, the player’s expected value for the strategy
played by the opponent, is qi.
A prior PDM, Pð j r0; qi0 Þ, is the model used by the player to represent his initial uncertainty about his opponent’s strategy.
The parameters’ subscript (0 here) indicates the number of observations on which the model is based. This prior model can
be updated to a posterior model after one or more rounds of the game, i.e., after observing nit . This amounts to normalizing
the product of the prior Dð j r0; qi0 Þ and the likelihood function Lð j nit Þ, resulting in a new Dirichlet density Dð j rt ; qit Þ, with
updated parameters3
rt ¼ r0 þ t and qit ¼
r0qi0 þ nit
r0 þ t ¼
r0




r0 þ t m
i
t : ð4Þ
The posterior PDM, Pð j rt; qit Þ, which represents the updated uncertainty about his opponent’s mixed strategy after
observing nit , is thus easily obtained by updating the parameters as shown above in Eq. (4).
In Eq. (4), we see that the expected strategy is a convex mixture of the expected strategy qi0 chosen prior to any obser-
vation and the frequency of observed strategies mit . As t becomes large relative to r0, the expected strategy is mainly deter-
mined by the observations. Considering that all observations have equal weight, this means that r0 can be interpreted as the
number of imaginary rounds that determine qi0 and is thus related to the trust the player has in his initial choice.
The problem the players are now faced with is how to choose the prior parameters r0 and qi0 . If the player initially knows
nothing about his opponent, every choice seems arbitrary. For any choice of prior PDM, an initial expected strategy qi0 is ﬁxed.
This has very strong behavioral implications, as we shall see in Section 4.2: it yields an essentially unique optimal strategy
for the player to follow in response to the opponent’s strategy, and we feel this to be unwarranted given the player’s initial
ignorance about what his opponent will do. Therefore, we are of the opinion that by using this classical approach, the player
initially assumes more than he actually knows, and uses an assessment model that is too precise and is therefore not a good
model for prior ignorance. In the next subsection, we propose a model that alleviates this arbitrariness by allowing for some
imprecision.
3.3. The imprecise Dirichlet model
We propose that initially, when we have no information concerning our opponent’s strategy, all qi0 2 Ri are considered
as possible initial expected strategies. To express this in mathematical terms, we use the set of Dirichlet densities
Dðr0;Ri0 Þ ¼ fDð j r0; qi0 Þ : qi0 2 Ri0 g, where Ri0 ¼ intðRiÞ, removing the arbitrary choice of an initial qi0 . A choice for r0 still
has to be made, however.
Instead of working with a linear prevision, we now work with a lower prevision P and an upper prevision P, deﬁned as the
lower and upper envelopes (i.e., inﬁma and suprema) of the set of linear previsions P0 ¼ fPð j DÞ : D 2 Dg. Because
Pð j DÞ ¼ Pð j DÞ, the upper prevision is implicitly known when we only specify a lower prevision. Instead of working
with P0, we work with the closed convex hull P ¼ coðP0Þ for mathematical practicality. The lower and upper envelopes
do not change, and there is a one-to-one relationship between lower previsions and closed convex sets of previsions.
Walley [12] gives an extensive treatment of imprecise probability models such as lower and upper previsions.
For any subset Ri of the interior intðRiÞ of the opponent’s simplex, the lower prevision Pð j r;RiÞ is called an imprecise
Dirichlet model or IDM [13]. We use such models as generalizations of PDMs in order to represent the player’s knowledge about
his opponent’s strategy. The lower prevision of the opponent’s mixed strategy ri is calculated component-wise as
PðriðsiÞ j r;RiÞ ¼ infqi2Ri PðriðsiÞ j r; qiÞ ¼ infqi2RiqiðsiÞ. So, loosely speaking, the expected chance for the opponent
to play si is at least infqi2Riq
iðsiÞ and, similarly, not higher than supqi2RiqiðsiÞ.
The prior IDM, Pð j r0;Ri0 Þ, with Ri0 ¼ intðRiÞ, is the model used by the player to represent his initial uncertainty about
his opponent’s mixed strategy. The choice Ri0 ¼ intðRiÞ has been argued [13] to result in a good model for prior ignorance.
Additional prior information could correspond to a more speciﬁc choice forRi0 . Using regular extension [12, Appendix J] – as
is done implicitly by Walley [13, Section 2.3] – we can update this model after one or more rounds of the game, i.e., after
observing nit . This amounts to updating every linear prevision in Pðr0;Ri0 Þ0 as shown in Section 3.2, which results in an
updated set of linear previsions Pðrt ;Rit Þ0, where rt ¼ r0 þ t and
Rit ¼
r0Ri0 þ nit













r0 þ t m
i
t : ð5Þ
The corresponding updated IDM is Pð j rt ;Rit Þ. When we consider thatPðrt ;Rit Þ ¼ coðPðrt;Rit Þ0Þ, the set of possible expected
strategies is the closure clðRit Þ of Rit . This set is convex and compact. Initially it is clðRi0 Þ ¼ clðintðRiÞÞ ¼ Ri.
As is shown at the end of Eq. (5), the expression for the set of possible expected strategies is a convex mixture of (i) the
set Ri0 , representing our initial ignorance, whose weight decreases as t increases (as more observations become available),
(ii) the frequency of observed strategies mit , whose weight increases as t increases. It is similar to the one found for a PDM in
Eq. (4). Again, r0 can be seen as the weight accorded to the initial beliefs.
3 Correspondence with Walley’s [13] notation: t $ N; r0 $ s; qi0 $ t, and nit $ n.
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3.4. Assessment rules
A player’s assessments about his opponent’s strategy after any round t are modelled by either a PDM Pð j rt; qit Þ or an IDM
Pð j rt ;Rit Þ, depending on which type of prior uncertainty model he uses. These previsions contain all the information the
player has about the unknown mixed strategy he thinks his opponent is playing.
Fudenberg and Kreps [5] introduce the concept of an assessment rule li. It determines the opponent’s strategies the
player believes are most likely to be played in the next round, based on the observed history hit and some initial beliefs.
Because we are focusing on the models used to represent the assessment, we emphasize that the assessment rule is a func-
tion of the current parameters’ value – denoted generically by qt – belonging to a model-dependent set Qt of possible values.
So an assessment rule is deﬁned as the map li : Qt ! }ðRiÞ : qt 7! liðqtÞ, where }ðRiÞ denotes the power set of Ri. When-
ever the parameters are implicit, we use lit ¼ liðqtÞ.
In contrast to Fudenberg and Kreps [5], we allow for assessment rules that correspond to more than one mixed strategy,
i.e., that are set-valued. Such a set contains all the opponent’s strategies the player believes are most likely to be played in the
next round. No distinction is made between strategies in the set, but they are all considered more likely than the strategies
that are not in the set. We also use proﬁles l ¼ ðli; liÞ of assessment rules, which then correspond to a subset of R.
When the player uses a PDM, qt ¼ ðrt ; qit Þ and – identifying singletons with elements – we have lit ¼ qit . When he uses an
IDM, qt ¼ ðrt ;Rit Þ and lit ¼ clðRit Þ. Classical ﬁctitious play as described by Brown [2] and Robinson [11] can be seen as a limit
case for r0 ! 0 of both the PDM and the IDM. In this case lit ¼ mit .
When considering extensions to ﬁctitious play, Fudenberg and Kreps [5] deﬁned some classes of assessment rules. To
make them ﬁt in the more general context of this paper, we reformulate them to allow for set-valued assessment rules. A
proﬁle of assessment rules belongs to a certain class if both its components belong to it.
An assessment rule li is adaptive if it attaches diminishing importance to earlier parts of the history, as the number of
rounds increases. Formally: for all t and all e > 0
9t > t : 8t0 > t : 8hit0 2Hit0 : 8ri 2 lit0 : riðsiÞ < e ð6Þ
for every pure strategy si that was not played in the last t0  t rounds.
Among all adaptive assessment rules, those that converge in some sense to the frequency of observed strategies mit are of








jmiðhit ; siÞ  riðsiÞj ¼ 0: ð7Þ
From Eqs. (4) and (5) it can be deduced that the assessment rules associated with the PDM and IDM are asymptotically empir-
ical and thus adaptive.
4. Deciding on an optimal strategy
In this section, we investigate how the player can choose a strategy for the next round, that is in some sense optimal for
him. First, in Section 4.1, we recall some typical ways of (partially) deciding on which strategy to use. Then, we look at how
the belief models for the opponent we introduced previously, the PDM and IDM, can be used together with these ways of decid-
ing (Sections 4.2 and 4.3). Finally, in Section 4.4, we make the link with so-called behavior rules.
4.1. Strategy types
A player’s strategy si is said to strictly dominate a strategy ri when its corresponding unknown payoff is strictly higher, i.e.,
when usi P uri pointwise and usi 6¼ uri . A strategy ri is called inadmissible if there is another strategy si that dominates it, other-
wise it is admissible. The set of admissible strategies is non-empty and can be written as a connected union of convex subsets
ofRi spanned by pure strategies. This property, and the other propertieswemention in this section can be seen to hold by using
ideas fromWalley’s book [12, Section 3.9] and looking at the set furi : ri 2 Rig, which forms a convex polytope in RN
i
.
A rational player can use admissibility as a criterion to limit the number of strategies among which he has to decide. As
can be seen from the deﬁnition, admissibility in no way depends on the opponent’s strategy choice. This implies that admis-
sibility cannot be directly incorporated into decisions based on the PDM or the IDM, which are assessment models for this un-
known strategy. However, this need not exclude our using it separately.
Now suppose that the player knows his opponent is going to play a strategy ri in Ri. Then, a best reply to ri is a strategy
for which the corresponding unknown payoff in ri is maximal. All admissible strategies are best replies to some ri and
there are admissible best replies for all ri, but not all best replies must be admissible. The set of all best replies to ri is




It is interesting to note that BRiðriÞ is a convex subset of Ri, spanned by a subset of the player’s pure strategies, so there exist
only a ﬁnite number of different sets of best replies. The collection of best replies to the strategies in Si  Ri is given by
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BRiðSiÞ :¼ Sri2Si BRiðriÞ, which in general is not a convex subset of Ri anymore. An illustration of the best reply map is
given in Fig. 2.
In sharp contrast to admissibility, it is clear that a player using best replies needs a model of his opponent. Even though a
player using a PDM or IDM does not know what his opponent’s strategy is going to be, the same idea, maximizing expected
payoff, is applicable, as will be shown in the next subsections.
Up to now, we have made no assumptions involving the opponent’s payoff ui. But when the player knows (or has sus-
picions that make him act as if he knows) he is playing a strictly competitive game (e.g., zero-sum games), his opponent sup-
posedly chooses a strategy that minimizes the player’s own payoff. Then it could be rational to play themaximin strategy that
maximizes this minimal payoff. There always exist (admissible) maximin strategies. When the opponent is known to restrict






Note that MMiðSiÞ  BRiðSiÞ and MMiðriÞ ¼ BRiðriÞ, so a maximin strategy is a special type of best reply.
As with best replies, the idea behind maximin strategies can be used in conjunction with an assessment model such as the
IDM, but not for the PDM (as we shall see in Section 4.3).
In classical ﬁctitious play, a player uses a best reply to mit , the frequency of observed strategies; i.e., he uses an element of
BRiðmit Þ. When using models such as the PDM and IDM, we have a different form of information: previsions Pð j r; qiÞ and
Pð j r;RiÞ. So we do not know an opponent’s strategy or his possible set of strategies. And although we do know his (set
of) expected strategies, we are – without further motivation – not justiﬁed in considering best replies to such expected strat-
egies. However, we shall see further on that, because linear previsions and payoff functions are linear, we can nevertheless
treat expected strategies as if they were actual strategies, and consider best replies to them as optimal.
4.2. Optimal strategies under a PDM
We now use the ideas behind the deﬁnition of a best reply in a setting where a probability distribution over all the oppo-
nent’s strategies is given, instead of a single strategy. We are going to look for a strategy for which the prevision of the cor-
responding gamble is maximal. This (maximizing expected utility) is the usual approach in Bayesian decision making [4,1].
So we are looking for argmaxri2Ri Pðuri j r; qiÞ.
Using Eqs. (2), (1) and (3), the prevision of the unknown payoff uri becomes
Pðuri j r; qiÞ ¼
Z
intðRiÞ
uri ðriÞDðri j r; qiÞdri ¼
X
si2Si
uri ðsiÞPðriðsiÞ j r; qiÞ ¼
X
s2S
uiðsÞriðsiÞqiðsiÞ ¼ uri ðqiÞ: ð10Þ
Eq. (8) then shows that argmaxri2Ri Pðuri j r; qiÞ ¼ argmaxri2Ri uri ðqiÞ ¼ BRiðqiÞ, a result that is based essentially on the bilin-
ear character of the payoff ui and on the linearity of the linear prevision Pð j r; qiÞ. It justiﬁes the approach that is usual with
ﬁctitious play [7], where the PDM is only used to get the expected strategy qi and BRiðqiÞ is the (non-empty) set of optimal
strategies.
Another line of reasoning, which will prove useful in Section 4.3, can be used to get argmaxri2Ri Pðuri j r; qiÞ as the set of
optimal strategies. When looking for a best reply to a strategy ri, the player’s own strategies ri are ordered according to
their expected payoff uri ðriÞ. This means that the relative order of two strategies ri and si is determined by looking at
the difference in payoff uri ðriÞ  usi ðriÞ. The generated order is linear: ri can either be better, worse, or as good as si.
With a PDM, the order is determined by the previsions of the payoff differences Pðuri  usi j r; qiÞ. Because Pð j r; qiÞ is
linear, this order is also linear. So then an optimal strategy ri is a maximal element of the order. This corresponds to the
non-negativity of Pðuri  usi j r; qiÞ for all si, which is equivalent to the criterion of optimality given above
min
si2Ri
Pðuri  usi j r; qiÞP 0 () Pðuri j r; qiÞPmax
si2Ri
Pðusi j r; qiÞ () ri 2 argmax
si2Ri
Pðusi j r; qiÞ ¼ BRiðqiÞ: ð11Þ
So when using a PDM as an assessment model for his opponent, the player makes a choice qi0 for his initial model parameter.








Fig. 2. An illustration of the best reply map for players with two pure strategies. The bold line gives the graph of BRi .
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sake of the argument, that after a large number of rounds t, it so happens that qit ¼ qi0 . This means that the player’s set of
optimal strategies after observing the opponent’s response during t rounds, is the same as when he sets out to play. So this
type of assessment model does not allow us to distinguish between decisions based on different numbers of observations.
The behavioral implications of the model (which strategy to play next) are always equally strong.
4.3. Optimal strategies under an IDM
When using an IDM, we cannot just maximize the prevision of an unknown payoff because we are working with a set of
linear previsions Pðr;RiÞ, or equivalently, with lower and upper previsions Pð j r;RiÞ and Pð j r;RiÞ.
What we do is use the IDM to generate an order of the player’s strategies. Compared to si, a strategy ri is
 equally good when both Pðuri  usi j r;RiÞ ¼ 0 and Pðuri  usi j r;RiÞ ¼ 0,
 strictly better when Pðuri  usi j r;RiÞ > 0, or, equivalently, strictly worse when Pðuri  usi j r;RiÞ < 0, and
 incomparable when none of the above hold.
The ‘strictly better’-relationship is now only a strict partial order, caused by the fact that Pð j r;RiÞ is not linear. We are
mainly interested in the maximal elements of this order, i.e., those that are undominated under the ‘strictly better’-relation-
ship. A maximal element is a mixed strategy ri that is not strictly worse than any other mixed strategy, so for which
minsi2Ri Pðuri  usi j r;RiÞP 0. This criterion is a clear generalization of Eq. (11), the criterion found when using a PDM. (Other
criteria are of course possible, our criterion is equivalent to maximality [12, Section 3.9] and, because of the convexity of the
set of gambles, to E-admissibility [10].)
By rewriting the criterion, we get a more explicit description of the optimal strategies. Using the deﬁnition of an upper
prevision, linearity, and Eq. (10), we ﬁnd
min
si2Ri








½uri ðqiÞ  usi ðqiÞP 0: ð12Þ
Considering that Ri and clðRiÞ are compact, convex sets and that unknown payoffs are bilinear functions, the maximin the-
orem [12, Section E6] applies, so the criterion becomes maxqi2clðRiÞ½uri ðqiÞ maxsi2Ri usi ðqiÞP 0. It can, and will, for any qi
in clðRiÞ, only be satisﬁed when ri ¼ BRiðqiÞ, which means BRiðclðRiÞÞ is the (non-empty) set of optimal strategies. All
strategies in this set are valid optimal choices, but when compared amongst themselves, they are either equivalent or incom-
parable. So within this set no strategy is strictly better than any other.
Whenever the player knows he is playing a strictly competitive game, it is rational for him to try and limit his losses.
When we deﬁned maximin strategies, the player knew what set Si his opponent was choosing his strategy from. Now
his beliefs are contained in an IDM Pð j r;RiÞ and to limit his losses, he tries to maximize the lower prevision of his unknown
payoff. (This would make no sense when using a PDM, as lower and upper previsions coincide.) This means an optimal strat-
egy ri is deﬁned by ri 2 argmaxsi2Ri Pðusi j r;RiÞ. Rewriting this criterion gives a more explicit description of the optimal
strategies for this case. The deﬁnition of a lower prevision gives argmaxri2Ri Pðuri j r;RiÞ ¼ argmaxri2RiminP2Pðr;RiÞPðuri Þ,
which is equal to argmaxri2Riminqi2clðRiÞuri ðqiÞ by Eq. (10). Using Eq. (9), the deﬁnition of a maximin strategy, we see that
the optimal strategies now correspond to the (non-empty) set MMiðclðRiÞÞ,4 which is a subset of BRiðclðRiÞÞ, the optimal
strategies when no assumptions about the opponent’s payoff are made.
So now, when using an IDM as an assessment model for his opponent, the player choosesRi0 ¼ intðRiÞ as his initial model
parameter. This implies that he initially plays a strategy in BRiðclðRi0 ÞÞ ¼ BRiðRiÞ or a strategy in MMiðRiÞ, which is a clas-
sical maximin strategy [1, Chapter 5]. This corresponds to the weakest possible rational behavior. After a number of rounds t,
the player uses a strategy in BRiðclðRit ÞÞ or in MMiðclðRit ÞÞ. Eq. (5) shows that clðRit Þ gets smaller as the number of obser-
vations increases, and so the behavioral implications also get stronger. Using an IDM, it is thus possible to distinguish deci-
sions based on different amounts of observational data, in contrast to the situation when using a PDM. As the number of
observations gets very large, the behavioral implications of an IDM often tend to be the same as those of a PDM, which will
be illustrated when discussing absorption to strict equilibria in Section 5.2. That this is not a general rule will be illustrated
when discussing convergence to mixed equilibria in Section 5.3.
4.4. Behavior rules
The player’s behavior during round t is the way he chooses a strategy. For a rational player, this behavior is based on the
assessments about his opponent’s strategy and on his own and possibly his opponent’s payoff.
In Section 4.2 we have seen that a rational player using a PDM Pð j rt ; qit Þ as his assessment of the opponent’s mixed strat-
egy (assumed ﬁxed), must choose any strategy in BRiðqit Þ in order to make an optimal decision, irrespective of the payoff ui
4 This illustrates that the choice of decision criterion can be separated from the choice of (imprecise) prior model, casting a new light on an old discussion
between subjective Bayesians [9] and game theorists [8].
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of his opponent. In Section 4.3, we have shown that similarly a rational player using an IDM Pð j rt ;Rit Þ as his assessment of
the opponent’s mixed strategy, must choose any strategy in BRiðclðRit ÞÞ, to make an optimal decision. In the latter case, how-
ever, knowledge about the opponent’s payoff ui can lead him to further reﬁne his choice, e.g., toMMiðclðRit ÞÞ  BRiðclðRit ÞÞ
when playing a strictly competitive game.
Together with assessment rules (see Section 3.4), Fudenberg and Kreps [5] introduce the concept of a behavior rule /i,
which determines the strategy the player will use in the next round (t þ 1), based on the observed history ht and some initial
beliefs. When qt 2 Qt are the parameters of the player’s belief model, a behavior rule is deﬁned as a map
/i : Qt ! Ri : qt 7! /iðqtÞ. Whenever the parameters are implicit, we use /it ¼ /iðqtÞ. We also use proﬁles of behavior rules
/ ¼ ð/i;/iÞ. So, if /t1 is equal to the proﬁle s, then s will be played in round t.
It is possible to write the behavior rules for the models we have discussed as a function of the assessment rules for these
models. (In general the assessment rules contain less information than the assessments (a PDM or an IDM). This is why we de-
rived the optimal strategies directly from these assessments.) For the PDM, qt ¼ ðrt; qit Þ, so
/iðrt ; qit Þ 2 BRiðliðrt ; qit ÞÞ ¼ BRiðqit Þ:
For the IDM, qt ¼ ðrt ;Rit Þ, so
/iðrt ;Rit Þ 2 BRiðliðrt ;Rit ÞÞ ¼ BRiðclðRit ÞÞ;
/iðrt ;Rit Þ 2 MMiðliðrt ;Rit ÞÞ ¼ MMiðclðRit ÞÞ ðfor strictly competitive gamesÞ:
In many cases the above equations do not deﬁne a unique behavior rule, more often so when using an IDM than when using a
PDM, but they say no more than this. To get a unique rule, one ideally uses other justiﬁable criteria (such as admissibility), but
otherwise has to resort to an arbitrary choice.
Behavior rules determine which histories are possible. A history is called compatiblewith the behavior rules / of the play-
ers, if it can be generated (with non-zero chance) by these behavior rules. Explicitly, this means that for every pure strategy
proﬁle htðt0Þ, with 1 6 t0 6 t, that is a component of a compatible history, the chance /t01ðhtðt0ÞÞ is strictly positive. This im-
plies that the randomization devices used by the players can select the pure strategies in htðt0Þ with non-zero chance. (The
uncertainty we talk about in this paragraph is due to the randomization mechanisms used by the players, which is why we
use the word chance.)
To consider extensions of ﬁctitious play, Fudenberg and Kreps [5] deﬁned some classes of behavior rules. We generalize
some of these to allow for set-valued assessment rules. A proﬁle of behavior rules belongs to a certain class if both its com-
ponents belong to it.
A behavior rule /i is calledmyopic relative to an assessment rule li if it maximizes the player’s immediate expected pay-
off, i.e., when /it 2 BRiðlit Þ for all t and ht . It is clear that the behavior rules we have deﬁned above for the models using the
PDM and the IDM are myopic relative to the assessment rules we have deﬁned in Section 3.4.
Let us look at a larger class of behavior rules, i.e., those for which immediate expected payoff only has to be maximized
asymptotically. We call a behavior rule /i strongly asymptotically myopic relative to the assessment rule li if, for some se-
quence et > 0 with limt!1et ¼ 0 and for all t and histories hit , it holds that
8ri 2 lit : 8~si 2 Si such that /itð~siÞ > 0 : u~si ðriÞ þ et Pmax
si2Si
usi ðriÞ: ð13Þ
This concept allows us to formulate results for a larger class of models than only the ones using the PDM or the IDM. It is used in
Theorems 3 and 4 of the next section.
5. Convergence results
In this section we give some results about the convergence of play to equilibria. These results are formulated using the
assessment rules and behavior rules introduced in Sections 3.4 and 4.4. They are similar to the ones presented by Fudenberg
and Kreps [5], but allow for set-valued assessment rules l. Because randomization devices are used – to be able to play mixed
strategies – these results hold with chance 1; this fact is not explicitly mentioned further on. The models based on the PDM or
the IDM are used as examples. After deﬁning equilibria, we look at convergence to pure equilibria in Section 5.2 and at con-
vergence to mixed equilibria in Section 5.3.
5.1. Equilibria
An equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle r for which the payoff for both players cannot be increased if one of them changes his
strategy, while his opponent’s strategy remains unchanged. It is well known that this corresponds to the strategy proﬁle
being a ﬁxed point of the combined best reply mapping (deﬁned as BRðrÞ ¼ BRiðriÞ  BRiðriÞ  R). So r is an equilibrium
if and only if r 2 BRðrÞ.
A strict equilibrium is a proﬁle s of pure strategies that is its own unique best reply, i.e., for which s ¼ BRðsÞ. A non-strict
equilibrium is called amixed equilibrium. The concepts above are illustrated in Fig. 3, where we specify some games by giving
the best reply graph for both players (this is equivalent to giving their payoff functions).
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5.2. Convergence to strict equilibria
First, let us look at when convergence to a strict equilibrium is guaranteed to occur. One situation was described by
Fudenberg and Kreps [5, Proposition 3.0]:
Theorem 1 (absorption to a strict equilibrium). If there is a strict equilibrium s that is played in round t of a history ht
compatible with myopic behavior rules / relative to the assessment rule l ¼ ðqi; qiÞ of players using a PDM, then s will be played
during all subsequent rounds t0 > t.
In Fig. 4, we give an illustration of a situation where absorption occurs. In this situation, both players use a PDM with r0 ¼ 2
and the best reply as a behavior rule. The prior assessments are described by l0. The table lists all the data necessary to deter-
mine the assessment rules lt for t up to 5 and the subsequent strategy proﬁles /t ¼ stþ1 ¼ ðsitþ1; sitþ1Þ played; ties were broken
arbitrarily. From round 5 onward, only the strict equilibrium s is played. In the picture, we show the evolution of lt with
increasing round number t.
We want to stress the fact that absorption does not necessarily occur when the assessment rule l is not singleton-valued.
This is illustrated in Fig. 5. Here, both players use an IDM with r0 ¼ 2 and the best reply as a behavior rule. The prior assess-
ments are described by l0 ¼ R. The table lists the information necessary to determine the assessment rule lt for the follow-
ing rounds and the subsequent strategy proﬁles /t played (again, an arbitrary choice was made between the different
possible strategy proﬁles). In the picture, we again show the evolution of lt with increasing round number t. Even though
s3 ¼ /2 ¼ s, absorption to this strict equilibrium does not occur as /3 6¼ s.
For set-valued l, the result can be obtained by strengthening the requirements:
Theorem 2 (conditional absorption to a strict equilibrium). If, for some history ht compatible with myopic behavior rules /
relative to the assessment rule l ¼ clðRiÞ  clðRiÞ of players using an IDM, the strategy proﬁle /t cannot differ from the strict
equilibrium s, then s will be played during all subsequent rounds t0 > t.
Look at the condition ‘‘[if] /t cannot differ from the strict equilibrium s”: due to myopia /t 2 BRðltÞ, so this condition is
satisﬁed if and only if BRðltÞ ¼ s.
Theorem 2 is illustrated in Fig. 6. It shows a possible continuation of the situation in Fig. 5; from round 10 onwards,
absorption has occurred. This illustrates that after a sufﬁcient number of rounds, the behavior of a player using an IDM often
tends to be the same as the behavior of a player using a PDM. The main reason is that, as the area of lt becomes smaller, it
behaves more and more like a point, i.e., intersections of lt with the best reply mappings BR



















ρ it 1 1 ρ it 2
ρ -it 1 1 ρ -it 2
– –
Fig. 4. An illustration of absorption when both players use a PDM with r0 ¼ 2 and respectively qi0 ¼ ð12 ; 12Þ and qi0 ¼ ð1;0Þ. Recall that a player’s assessments lit
about his opponent’s strategy are determined by the assessment model’s parameters; here, these are the number of (real and imaginary) rounds rt and the
expected strategy qit . The latter evolves with the frequency of observed strategies m
i
t , which reﬂects the opponent’s behavior /
i
t . Round numbers t are given






















Fig. 3. Examples of equilibria for players with two pure strategies. On the left, there is one strict equilibrium; in the middle, two strict and one mixed; on
the right, one mixed. Equilibria correspond to intersections of the graphs of BRi and BRi (see Fig. 2).
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We can also investigate when convergence to a strict equilibrium is guaranteed to have occurred. This leads to a gener-
alization of a result of Fudenberg and Kreps [5, Proposition 4.1] to set-valued assessment rules.
Theorem 3 (repeated play of a pure strategy proﬁle). Consider an inﬁnite history h1 in H1 such that for some t0, a pure
strategy proﬁle s is played in all subsequent rounds. If h1 is compatible with behavior rules / that are strongly asymptotically
myopic relative to the adaptive assessment rules l, then s is an equilibrium.
The conditions on the assessment rules of this theorem are satisﬁed when the players use an IDM or a PDM. Note, however,
that this result is also valid for other models satisfying the conditions.
5.3. Convergence to mixed equilibria
Because absorption cannot be generalized straightforwardly to mixed equilibria, we immediately look at when conver-
gence to a mixed equilibrium is guaranteed to have occurred. This leads to the following generalization to set-valued assess-
ment rules of another result of Fudenberg and Kreps [5, Proposition 4.2].
Theorem 4 (repeated play of a mixed strategy proﬁle). Let the inﬁnite history h1 inH1 be such that for some mixed strategy
proﬁle r, limt!1mðht ; Þ ¼ r holds, where ht is a partial history of h1 for every t. If the inﬁnite history h1 is compatible with
behavior rules / that are strongly asymptotically myopic relative to the assessment rules l that are asymptotically empirical,
then r is an equilibrium.
The conditions on the assessment rules of this theorem are satisﬁed when the players use an IDM or a PDM. Again, this result
is not restricted to these models.
Even though the focus in this paper is mostly on the use of the IDM and not on the interpretation of ‘learning to play a
mixed strategy’, we would like to ﬁnish this section by showing that learning using an IDM (or other models with set-valued
assessment rules) can remedy some pathological behavior of the PDM (or other models with singleton-valued assessment
rules). Fudenberg and Kreps [5, Section 5] argue that when using a PDM, most of the time no mixed strategy is played, but
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ν it 1 1 ν it 2
ν -it 1 1 ν -it 2
– –
Fig. 6. An illustration of conditional absorption when both players use an IDM with r0 ¼ 2. See Fig. 4 for an explanation about the notation.
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This is illustrated with the battle of the sexes [3], where for some initial assessments a suboptimal strategy proﬁle is con-
stantly played, even though convergence to the mixed equilibrium occurs.5 This is shown in Fig. 7, where both players use a
PDM with r0 ¼ 12 and the best reply as a behavior rule. The prior assessments are described by l0 (the value of its components is
given at the top of the table). We see that only the suboptimal strategy proﬁles (1,1) and (2,2) are played, even though conver-
gence to r ¼ ðð23 ; 13Þ; ð23 ; 13ÞÞ occurs for both lt and mt .
When the players use an IDM for the same game, the same history can be played, but it is now very likely that the path-
ological correlated gameplay does not occur. This is illustrated in Fig. 8, where both players use an IDM with r0 ¼ 12 and the
best reply as a behavior rule. The prior assessments are described by l0 ¼ R. Even though we took the partial history shown
in this example to be the same as in Fig. 7, it is clear that when the choice between the different possible /t is made arbi-
trarily (or using some targeted method), it is highly likely that the pathological gameplay is interrupted at some point. In the
table, we indicate all the strategy proﬁles that could have been chosen differently with a star. This illustrates what we hinted
at the end of Section 4.3, that after a sufﬁcient number of rounds, the behavior of a player using an IDM can sometimes be very
different from the behavior of a player using a PDM, thanks to using set-valued assessment rules instead of point-valued ones.
6. Overview of the IDM’s advantages and conclusions
So which of the two models for assessment we have discussed, the PDM and the IDM, should be used? Of course this de-
pends on the situation. Both are based on a form of Bayesian inference. Both should reﬂect the available data and the
assumptions made. Neither should depend on any hidden or unjustiﬁed assumptions.
Assumptions about the initial strategy choice qi0 of the opponent, necessary for using a PDM, are often unjustiﬁed. For
example, the assumptions of ﬁctitious play do not say anything about the initial strategy choice. So then we can only say
something about the initial strategy choice by making additional assumptions. This is the main reason we have proposed
using the IDM, for which this is not necessary (cf. Section 3.3). One consequence of initially having less information, is that
5 Fudenberg and Levine [6] propose cautious variants of ﬁctitious play to address this problem and others. They focus on a modiﬁcation of the players’












μ t ρ it ρ -it
ρ it 1 1 ρ it 2
ρ -it 1 1 ρ -it 2
Fig. 7. An illustration of pathological gameplay with the battle of the sexes when both players use a PDM with r0 ¼ 12 and qi0 ¼ ð25 ; 35Þ ¼ qi0. No move could
















ν it 1 1 ν it 2
ν -it 1 1 ν -it 2
– –
Fig. 8. Gameplay with the battle of the sexes when using set-valued assessment rules when both players use an IDM with r0 ¼ 12. See Fig. 4 for an explanation
about the notation.
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the behavior resulting from using an IDM (instead of a PDM) is less decisive, i.e., the set of optimal strategies can be larger (cf.
Sections 4.2 and 4.3). This is something very natural and honest: when taking decisions, one should be less decisive when
one has less information.
Another interesting result similarly involves the inﬂuence of additional information. Knowing that the game is strictly
competitive does not restrict the set of optimal strategies when using a PDM, but may restrict this set when using an IDM
(cf. Section 4.3).
Considering the similarities and differences between the PDM and the IDM, it is not surprising that this is reﬂected in the
resulting behavior. As we have illustrated, the similarity allows absorption to strict equilibria to remain possible (cf.
Section 5.2). The difference allows some pathological forms of gameplay to become less likely (cf. Section 5.3).
The basis for the differences is the possibility of having assessment rules that are set-valued instead of point-valued (cf.
Section 3.4). We have investigated the consequences of using such set-valued assessment rules and have shown that existing
results about convergence to strict and mixed equilibria occurring can be generalized to this context (cf. Section 5). However,
the possibility of obtaining behavior different from the classical learning models is probably the most interesting aspect of
the model we propose in this paper. We think that the best way to achieve some goal or generate some speciﬁc behavior is by
formulating additional optimality criteria that further restrict the set of optimal strategies in a way that encourages achiev-
ing the goal or that favors the speciﬁc behavior. A speculative example: to avoid absorption to a strict equilibrium, it might
be useful to discourage use of the same pure strategy in subsequent rounds.
With regard to extending the results of this paper, it is clear that the approach to learning we have given here for two-
player games can be generalized to multiplayer games. There are two immediate options [7]. When the opponents are as-
sumed to play independently, a separate IDM can be used for each of the opponents. When this assumption is not made, one
IDM on the set spanned by all the tuples of the opponents’ pure strategies can be used. We will not speculate on the gener-
alization of the convergence results to the multiplayer case.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2 (includes Theorem 1 as a special case). The fact that /t cannot be different from s means that






uri ðqit Þ ¼ si: ðA:1Þ
So the strategy si is the unique best reply (payoff maximizer) for all q
i
t 2 Rit . By myopia /itþ1 2 BRiðRitþ1Þ and for the round















































Because of Eq. (A.1), si is the unique maximizer of the ﬁrst term. Because s is a strict equilibrium, this is also the case for the
second term. This implies that si is also the unique maximizer of their sum, or that BR
iðRitþ1Þ ¼ si. Thus, by myopia, /tþ1 ¼ s.
Induction completes the proof. h
Lemma 5 (used to prove Theorems 3 and 4). Consider an inﬁnite history h1 inH1, adaptive assessment rules l and a strategy
proﬁle r such that for each player i there is a sequence of strictly positive reals dt (indexed by the round number t) converging to 0
for which it holds for all t that
8ri 2 lit : 8si 2 Si : 9kr
i
si ;t 2 R : j kr
i
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If h1 is compatible with behavior rules / that are strongly asymptotically myopic relative to the assessment rules l, then r is an
equilibrium.




shorthand for 1Psi2Sikrisi ;t . Because the behavior rules / are strongly asymptotically myopic (Eq. (13)) we can write for
each player i, for all t and every ri 2 lit that for all pure strategies ~si for which /itð~siÞ > 0, it holds that
u~si ðriÞ þ et Pmaxsi2Siusi ðriÞ, where et > 0 is some sequence converging to 0. Or, because of Eq. (A.2) and the bilinearity
of the payoff, again we can write for each player i, for all t and every ri 2 lit that for all pure strategies ~si for which
























Because r is not an equilibrium, it holds for at least one player – called j – that rj 62 BRjðrj Þ. Because – as mentioned in Sec-
tion 4.1 – every rj 2 BRjðrj Þ is a convex combination of the sj 2 BRjðrj Þ, there is a strategy s^j 62 BRjðrj Þ such that rjðs^jÞ > 0.
So for this strategy s^j,
max
sj2Sj
usj ðrj Þ  us^j ðrj Þ ¼ c > 0: ðA:4Þ
We now show that this implies that there is some t such that /jtðs^jÞ ¼ 0 for all t > t. Ex absurdo, assume that this does not
hold, then for all t there is some t0 > t such that /jt0 ðs^jÞ > 0, or in other words, there is some subsequence /jt0 of /jt such that

















































usj ðsjÞ  us^j ðsjÞ
 
:
Because c > 0, limt0!1et0 ¼ 0, limt0!1dt0 ¼ 0, and limt0!1krjrj ;t0 ¼ 1, this cannot hold, so for sufﬁciently large t
, /jtðs^jÞ ¼ 0 if
t > t. Put in another way: there is a strategy s^j, for which rjðs^jÞ > 0, that is not in the history from t onwards. Because
of the adaptivity of the assessment rules (Eq. (6)), rjðs^jÞ will be arbitrarily small for all rj 2 lt j for sufﬁciently large t. This
contradicts (j’s opponent’s version of) Eq. (A.2), which states that rjðs^jÞ is at least krj
rj ;t
rjðs^jÞ  dt (strictly positive for sufﬁ-
ciently large t). We conclude that r must be an equilibrium. h
Proof of Theorem 3. Considering that the assessment rules are adaptive (Eq. (6)), it holds for both players i that for all t and
all e > 0
9te > t : 8t0 > te : 8hit0 2Hit0 t0 : 8si 2 Si such that nit0 ðsiÞ ¼ nit ðsiÞ : 8ri 2 lit0 : riðsiÞ < e:
We can always choose te > t0 (implying that /t0 ¼ s for all t0 > te). Thus nit0 ðsiÞ ¼ nit0 ðsiÞ will hold for every si 6¼ si . This
means every ri 2 lit0 can be written as ri ¼ riðsi Þsi þ
P
si2Si ;si 6¼si r
iðsiÞsi, where riðsiÞ < e if si 6¼ si , due to adap-
tivity. Because e can be chosen arbitrarily small, we can create a sequence converging to 0 that ﬁts the conditions of
Lemma 5. Applying Lemma 5 completes the proof. This is done by identifying r ¼ s and krisi ;t ¼ riðsiÞ for all si in Si. h
Proof of Theorem 4. Considering that the assessment rules are asymptotically empirical (Eq. (7)), i.e., that
8e > 0 : 9t0 > 0 : 8t > t0 : sup
ri2lit ;si2Si
jmiðhit ; siÞ  riðsiÞj <
e
2
and using the assumptions of Theorem 4, i.e., that
8e > 0 : 9t1 > 0 : 8t > t1 : sup
ri2lit ;si2Si
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it holds for both players i that for all e > 0 there exists a t2 ¼maxðt0; t1Þ such that for all t > t2 and for all si 2 Si
sup
ri2lit
jri ðsiÞ  riðsiÞj ¼ sup
ri2lit
jri ðsiÞ  miðhit ; siÞ þ miðhit ; siÞ  riðsiÞj
6 sup
ri2lit













si ;t < e for all t > t2. Because e can be
chosen arbitrarily small, we can create a sequence converging to 0 that ﬁts the conditions of Lemma 5. Applying Lemma 5
again completes the proof. h
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